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NOTES.
DAMAGES FOR INJURY FROM FRIGHT AT THE SIGHT OF AN-

case of Hanbrook v. Stokes' recently decided
by the English Court of Appeal, brings out in bold relief the problem
of liability for death, bodily injury, or illness caused by fright at
OTHER'S PERIL-The

[x925] x K. B. 141.
(280)

NOTES

seeing another put in peril by an act of the defendant. The facts were
striking. The defendant, by his agent, left a motor lorry, with engine running, handbrake insecurely set, and wheels straight, at the
top of a steep declevity in a narrow street. The lorry ran away and
killed a child crossing the street. The child's mother, standing nearby,
was so shocked at the sight that she soon died as a result. In the
suit based on her death, the court held that the plaintiff could recover,
whether the shock resulted from the mother's fear of harm to herself, or from fear of harm to the.child.
This decision supposedly overrules the earlier case of Smith v.
Johnson 2 and a dictum in Dulieu v; White 8 based thereupon. Also,
it is contrary to the result reached in American cases in Indiana,' Minnesota,5 and Georgia.6 However, it seems to be in accord with decisions in New York Texas 8 Alabama,' and California.10 Such a
conflict challenges attention and demands a careful examination of
the problems involved.
The first question is whether the facts show the necessary elements of an act of the defendant wrongful toward the plaintiff. It
;night be objected that this question was not involved in Hambrook
v. Stokes 11 because, according to the report, the act of the defendant
was "admittedly negligent." However, that the case did not go on
this narrow ground is shown by the statement of Atkin, L. J., that
'apart from the admission in the pleadings, I think the cause of
ation is complete." In other words, the risk created by the defendant's act, was held to be a legal wrong toward the mother.
What was the exact risk to the mother? This does not clearly
appear. In the first place, the report does not plainly show where
*Unreported, but referred to in Duliea v. White, infra in note 3.
[[19o] 2 K. B. 669.
'Cleveland Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N. E. 917 (1goo).
'Sanderson v. Northern Pacific Ry., 88 Minn. 163, 92 N. W. 5W2 (1902).
'Goddard v. Watters, 14 Ga. App. 722, 82 S. E. 3o4 (914) ; Southern Ry.
Co. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S. E. 28 (iqi6).
'Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., i62 App. Div. 794, 148 N. Y. Supp. 41
(1914).

F. Ry. Co. v. Coopwood, 96 S. W. io2 (Tex- Civ. App.,
xgo6)."Gulf, C.. & S.
°Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Alabama
Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, x5 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 2o (1916).
1'Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 29 z76 Pae. 40 (i918).

" Supra, note z.
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tl:. mother was standing. If she had been standing within the
probable path of the runaway, the risk would have been one of
direct bodily harm. Had she been standing some few feet away
from the probable path, the risk of direct bodily harm would have
been less, but there still would have been a great risk of nervous
shock resulting from fear of injury to herself. However, if she
had been standing on a raised porch or steps some feet above the
street level, or in an enclosed doorway, but still in sight of her child,
the ribk of bodily contact would have been still less, but the risk of
shock at sight of the child's injury would have been as great as in
the former cases. Even in this last situation, the mother had a right
to be on the highway, and in the exercise of this right might have
stepped into the street at any minute. Hence she was far from being completely beyond the limit of actual bodily risk.
The decision, then, that the defendant's act was wrong toward
the mother, involved at the very most, merely a holding that the
mother had a right to be protected from risk which, to some degree, involved danger of direct bodily injury."' The case can hardly
be said to be an authority for the proposition that where the whole
risk involved to the plaintiff is risk of shock at seeing another
wrongfully injured, the creation of this risk is a wrong toward the
plaintiff."2 Viewing thus the decision on this point, there is little
doubt that it lays down no new law. It is not a moot proposition that
every person has the right to be free from unreasonable risk of direct
bodily harm.
Also, the decision does not necessarily contravene the earlier
holding in Smith v. Johnson," which merely was that one shocked
by the defendant's "negligent" killing of another, could not recover.
It is quite possible that this was merely a case where there was no
risk of bodily contact to the plaintiff; and if so, it does not clash
' That the decision is thus limited appears also from the language of
Atkin, L. J., where, at page 129, he says: "The cause of action appears to be
created by a breach of the ordinary duty to take reasonable care to avoid
inflicting personal injuries followed by damages."
'There is a dictum on page 129, however, which indicates that the
court would reach the same conclusion in such a case. Atkin, L. J., says:
"If it were necessary, however, I should accept the view that 'the duty extended to the duty to take care to avoid threatening personal injury to a culd
in such circumstances as to cause damage by shock to a parent or guardian.
then present, and that the duty was owed to the parent or guardian.
" Supra, note 2.
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with the Ham brook case. The same can be said of the dictum in
Dulicu v. White.15
There are several American cases which seem to go fully as far
as the Hambrook case; and at least two which clearly go further, to
the full extent of being clearly contrary to any construction of
Smith v. Johnson " and the dictum in Dulieu v. White.?
In Spearman v. McCrary,' the defandant drove an automobile
at high speed past a buggy in which were tile plaintiff's childret4
and near which she herself was standing. The mule hitched to the
buggy, becoming frightened, ran away, and the mother miscarried as
a result of her shock at seeing the children injured. In Alabama
Fuel Co. v. Baladoni,"' the defendaht shot the plaintiff's dog, which
was but a few feet from the plaintiff's child, who in turn was within
a few feet of the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff's consequent miscarriage in both cases resulted from her fear of injury to her children, it is apparent that she was within a very real risk of bodily
injury from the defendant's act. Hence these cases go merely as
far as the Ham brook case.
In Gulf Ry. Co. v. Coopwood,0 however, no direct bodily injury
was threatened to the plaintiff. There the defendant's servants refused to help the plaintiff's daughter off a train after she had been
taken very ill. This resulted in mental anguish and illness to the
mother, and she was permitted to recover therefor. The court said,
"The principle of such liability rests upon the fact that the wrong
done the child under such circumstances, is a wrong inflicted upon
the mother herself." n
A similarly striking decision is the New York case of Cohn v.
Ansonia Realty Conpany.22 -The defendant's servant left an elevator
unattended with its door insecurely closed. The plaintiff's children,
"Supra, note 3.

note 2.
uSupra, note 3.

'Supra,

"Supra,. note to.
"Supra, note 9. See also Ludley v. Knowlton, jupra, note io.
"Supra, note 9.
Compare the dictum of Atkin, L. J., zupra in note 13, in which he care-

fully says that if he were to extend the decision of the Hambrook case to
a situation involving no risk of bodily harm to the parent, he would do so
because the duty not.to shock the parent was a duty owed to the parent, and
not to the child.
"Supra, note 7.
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attracted by the empty elevator, opend the door, operated the controls and set the car in motion. The plaintiff, perceiving this, fainted
from fear of harm to the children, and fell down the elevator shaft.
It is obvious that the only risk of bodily harm involved in the defendant's act, would lie in the attractiveness of the empty car. Such
attractiveness may have been an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
the infants, but certainly was not an unreasonable risk to the adult
plaintiff. Then the only risk to the plaintiff was a danger of
shock from seeing the children harmed. However, the court permitted a recovery. The case is not so outspoken as the Gulf Ry. Co.
v. Coopwood in declaring that the wrong toward the children is a
wrong toward the plaintiff. But does not the case so decide? Unless it does, the recovery which it permits can be based only on the
idea that the plaintiff, although not wronged, can recover on the
basis of the breach of the children's right; in other words, that A
can recover if actually harmed by a wrong toward B. Such a doctrine of "transferred negligence" would be startling; 23 wherefore it
is safest to say that the Cohn case does decide that the risk of shock
at seeing another negligently harmed, is a legal wrong toward the
plaintiff.
It will be noted that these cases go only so far as to hold that
there is a legal wrong toward a mother by putting her child in danger in her presence and thus creating a risk of shock. Will the rule
be limited to mothers, or to cases of close relationship, or will it
be extended to any case where there is an unreasonable risk of shock
created? Certainly, logic would extend the rule to the latter case.
No doubt it would be possible for A so wantonly, barbarously, and
atrociously to mangle or kill B before the eyes of an utter stranger,
that the latter's reaction of nausea and sickness would be fully as
normal as that of the mothers in the decided cases. In such a situation, the risk to the stranger being, by hypothesis, as great as the
" The following cases bold that an action will lie only for a breach ofduty owed the plaintiff. As to comrron law duties: Converse v. Walker, 30
Hun. 5Q6 (N. Y.. 1883) ; Akers v. Chicago R.. R Co., s8 Minn. .54o,6o N. W.
66g (i89); Pittsfield Mfg. Co. v. Pittsfield Shoe Co., 71 N. H. 522.. r3 Ati.
As to statutory duties: Atkinson v. Newcastle Water Works,
807 (z).
L R., 2 Exch. Div. 441 (1877); Tingle v. R. R.. 6o Ia. 333, 14 N. W. 32o
(1882). See, also, cases collected in i Bohlen's Cases on Torts, 355, n.4-
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risk to the mothers, any distinction would be purely arbitrary. 2'
However, no cases have so decided. There are cases of recovery for

damage from shock resulting from witnessing a malicious or wanton
disturbance,"5 but these all involve some risk of direct bodily injury
to the plaintiff, and hence are not authorities beyond the Hambrook
case. Flatly contrary to the rule in Gulf Ry. Co. v. Coopwood and
Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co. is the weight of American authority in
cases where no risk of bodily harm toward the plaintiff was proved.Thus the more general rule does not go beyond the Hambrook case.
Assuming the legal wrong to exist, this must still be the
legal cause of the injury. Is such cause present? In England where
fright has not been considered as breaking the chain of causation since
the decision in Dulieu v. Wlite," and where it has been flatly laid
down in Polemis v. Furness2 that forseeability does not enter into
the question of causation, there can be no doubt that in a case such
as Hambrook v. Stokes, this element of cause is present. In the
great majority of American jurisdictions, the rule is the same."
Some courts, however, still insist-that the exact injury resulting must
have been reasonably foreseeable,"0 and on this ground refuse a recovery, saying that even though the defendant was "negligent" toward the plaintiff, still no reasonably prudent man would have foreseen that a nervous prostration would result through fear or harm to
another.1 It is submitted that the former is the better rule; and
that foreseeability does not enter into this aspect of the case.
"Compare the statement of Atkin, L. I., in Hambrook v. Stokes, supra,
note x, that: "I should find it difficult to explain why the duty was confined to the case of parent or guardian and child and did not extend to
other relations of life also involving intimate associations, and why it did
not eventually extend to bystanders."
"See the discussion in Lambert v. Brewster, 125 S. E. 244 (W. Va.,
1924); also Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890).
"See supra, notes 4, 5 and 6.
[goI] 2 K. B. 669.
N[IgiZ] 3 K. B. 560, 37 Times I; R_ 940.
Stewartv. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584 (1875) ; Oil City v. Robinson, 99 Pa.
x (88) ; Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 Atd. 33 (1891) ; Armstrong v.
Railway Co., 123 Ala. 233, 26 So. 329 (898) ; Watson v. Dilts, ix6 Iowa 249,
89 N. W. xo68 (902).
:See 72 U. OF PA. L REv. S52; I Thompson, Negligence (z ed., igox)
53: Proximate cause is probable cause; remote cause is improbable cause."
"If the disease was not likely to result from the accident, and was not
one which defendant could have reasonably foreseen . . , then the accident was not the proximate cause." Per Wiley, C. J., in Cleveland R. R.
Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N. E. 917 (19oo).
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In conclusion, it seems that cases of injury from fright at anothcr's peril hinge mainly on the question of whether a legal right
of the plaintiff has been violated. When the plaintiff has been put
within an unreasonable risk of direct bodily harm, such violation
exists. When the plaintiff is not within range of such risk of bodily
harm to himself, but is within range of shock at another's harm, most

cases hold that no such violation is present. At least two cases hold
otherwise, one flatly declaring a violation to be present, and the other
probably so holding, although possible holding that a wrong toward
A will support an action by B.
M.E.G.
THE POWER OF A STATE To TAX THE FRANCHISE OF A FOREIGN

CORPORATION DOING EXCLUSIVELY

INTERSTATE

BusiNE-S-The

United States Supreme Court has not found it easy to arbitrate in the
conflict between the power of the state to tax and the power of Congress to regulate commerce. Since the latter power is constru d to
give Congress exclusive control of interstate commerce, any burden
imposed by the state is a usurpation of that control. A direct tax on
interstate commerce is a burden and is unconstitutional, but a tax
which indirectly affects it is not a burden, and is valid 1 Such is the
general rule laid down by the Supreme Court. One test, fairly accurate and easy of application, is that any state tax is a burden
which discriminates directly or indirectly against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce. 2 When the tax is not discriminatory, the problem is more difficult. A state may tax tangible
or intangible property in the state, even when it is used exclusively in
interstate commerce.' It may tax net income derived exclusvely from
interstate commerce.' But it may not tax the operation or act of interstate commerce by a tax upon property in transit through the
state,' or by taking a percentage of gross receipts; I nor may it ri'Gray, Limitations of Taxing Power, Chap.

155

'Supra, note z, sections 854 et seq.
'Pullman's Co. v. Penna., 141 U. S. 18 (i8to); Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams,
U. S. 683 (1894); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 (x896).
'United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 32! (1917); Shaffer v.

Carver,
254

1o.

252

U. S. 37 (i91g); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,

U. S. 113 (92o).

'Eurika Pipe Line Co. v. Hallaghan, 25sj U. S. 265 (xg2z); United Fuel
Gas Co. v. Hallaghan, 257 U. S. 27 (1921),
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quire a license fee to be paid before an interstate occupation or business may be carried on."
The state may tax the franchise of any domestic corporation,*
for corporate existence is a privilege which the state may grant or
withhold. It may also tax the franchise to do intrastate business of
a foreign corporation. 0 But the state cannot withhold from a foreign
corporation the right to do interstate business within its borders; 11
to do so would be to interfere with and burden such commerce. Does
it follow that any tax which it imposes on the franchise of such a
corporation doing exclusively an interstate business is invalid? "
In Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier et a.l.," the United States Supreme
Court so holds, Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting. The corporation,
chartered in Maryland, "owns and operates a pipe line extending from
within Oklahoma through Missouri to a point in Illinois." 14 Through.
its pipe lines it conducted crude oil from Oklahoma to Illinois, neither
receiving nor delivering oil in Missouri, where, however, it had its
principal offices and conducted most of its business; where it maintained telegraph and telephone lines, and three pumping stations; and
where it owned and operated motor trucks. It had obtained authority
from the state to engage exclusively in the business of transporting oil
by pipe line, thereby acquiring the right of eminent domain, and had
paid a license tax and a general property tax. In its opinion, the Court
'Philadelphia SS. Co. v. Penna., 122 U. S. 326 (1886); Crew Levick Co.
v. Penna., 245 U. S. 292 (gxn).
'Pembina Mining Co. v. Penna., 125 U. S. i81 (i888); McCall v. California, 136 U. S. io4 (889).
'Delaware Railroad Tax, 8s U. S. 206 (1874).
'Keokuk Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626 (igoo); Schwab v. Richardson, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6o (1924).
'Osborn v. Florida, 164 U. S. 65o (i897); Pullman Co. v. Adam%
189 U. S. 42o (19o3,; Alien v. Pullman's Pal. Car Co., 191 U. S. 17x (1903);

Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emerson, 258 U. S. 29o (i9=).
uNorfolk, etc., R. R. Co. v. Penna., 136 U. S. 114 (1889); St. Louis
S. W. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 35o (1914). The Telegraph Company cases are not itdctly in point for a federal statute gives them the right
to enter; see Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. x
(1877); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, x25 U. S. 53o (1887).
"Many dicta: see Norfolk, etc., R. R. Co. v. Penna., .supra,note ir;
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, i66 U. S. 185 (t896); Pullman Co. v. Kansas,
216 U. S. 6 (19o). .
45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184 (x924).
b11id., p. 184.
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stated that the operation of the pipe line was interstate commerce, and
that all the activities of the corporation in the state were incidental to
and inseparable from such operation, and decided that therefore the
corporation was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. The correctness of- this much of the decision cannot be doubted.15 The majority, citing a decision of the state court,1 6 held that the tax was upon
the privilege or right to do business,7 and that since the business done
was entirely interstate commerce, the tax was directly upon such commerce and therefore unconstitutional.
Under such a construction of the taxing statute the decision is
unimpeachable. A tax on the privilege to do business is a tax on the
business; a tax directly on the business of interstate commerce has
always been held invalid." But 'Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting
opinion claims the tax is not upon the privilege to do business, but
"upon the privilege of carrying on business in corporate form." 19 An
examination of the statute itself would seem to justify this view.20
The tax is denominated "an annual franchise tax." 21 It is a tax upon
corporations both foreign and domestic, and not upon individuals.
Clearly the subject io be taxed is the privilege of using the corporate
form and not the privilege of doing business. 22 In determining the
subject matter of the tax the Supreme Court of the United States is
i See Norfolk, etc., R. R. Co. v. Penna., supra, note ix; Hayman v. Hay,
236 U. S. 178 (1915.); Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147
(2918).
State v. State Tax Commission, 282 Mo. 213, 234 (1920).
*Supra, note 13, p. 185.
13 See cases cited supra, note 7.
' Supra, note 13, p. 187.
Sections 9836-948 REv. STAT. MO. 1919, pp. 3015-3020.
"A tax of 1/2o of i per cent. of that proportion of the par value of the.
capital stock and surplus which the property and assets of the corporation

within the state bears to all its property and assets. The measure of the
tax was not discussed in the opinion of the court.
"See Flint v. Stone Tracy C., 220 U. S.'107, z62'(191o), where, in
answer to the contention that the federal franchise tax on all corporations

annually "with respect to doing business by such corporations" violated the
Fourteenth Amendment in that it taxed corporations doing business and
not individuals also. Mr. Justice Day said: "The tax is laid upon privileges.
which exist in conducting business with advantages which inhe'e in the corporate capacity of those taxed . . . not the mere buying or selling or
handling of goods, which may be the same whether done by corporations or
individuals."

NOTES

not bound by the decision of the state court, 2s and if it were, the case
cited as authority is not strictly in point.-4 However correct this different premise of Mr. Justice Brandeis may be, his conclusion therefrom is less easy to sustain. Such a tax upon the corporate privilege
of a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce,
he states, is not a direct burden upon such commerce. His criticism
that the language used in the majority opinion would prohibit a tax
upon the corporate privilege of both domestic and foreign corporations
is inconsequential, since the Court is dealing in this case only with a
foreign corporation. He also urges that, although the corporation is
doing only interstate business, the privilege granted gives the right to
do intrastate business, inferring that it is therefore taxable, to which
the majority answers that "the power to tax depends upon what was
done and not upon what might have, been done." Yet Mr. Justice
Brandeis' contention is supported by Ficklcn v. Shelby County Taxing
2
District.
Since the tax applies equally to domestic and foreign corporations,
and to both intrastate and interstate business, it is not discriminatory
and can be invalid only if it is a direct burden. The tax is trifling in
omount, and it is no more a direct burden to tax the corporate privilege where the busincss is exclusively interstate commerce, claims Mr.
Justice Brandeis, than to tax the property or the income. The dicta
of prior cases are directly against him, 2 5 though the reasoning behind
them is far from satisfactory. It is argued that a state cannot withhold the right to engage in interstate commerce within its borders, and
that hence it follows that there is no privilege for it to grant to foreign
corporations and nothing for it to tax.,' But does it follow? It has
" In Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 2io U. S. 217, 227 (19o8),
Mr. Justice Holmes says: "Neither the state courts nor the legislatures by giving the tax a particular name or by use of some form of words can take away
our duty to consider its nature and effect."
" Supra, note 26, p. 218; the court, in determining the tax to be an
excise tax and not a property tax, said loosely: "A franchise tax is not one
levied upon property but one placed on the right to do business." It was
not distinguishing between the right to do business and the right to use the
corporate form. The question at issue was, what did the legislature intend
to include in "surplus."
36145 U. S. 1 (1892). See discussion in article by Thomas Reed Powell,
Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Power of the
States, 32 HARv. L. REv. 378 (1919-19).
"See cases cited supra, note xi.
=Supra, note 25, 31 HARv. L. Rav. 576; Henderson, The Position of
Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law, xio.
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been held that a state may not prohibit a foreign corporation doing
both intrastate and interstate business from carrying on the intrastate
business, if such a prohibition would materially affect its interstate
business; 28 the above reasoning applied here would prevent the state
from taxing the intrastate business; but it is not so held.21 Thus it
appears that the state may tax even though it may not prohibit. As to
individuals, the tax upon the privilege to do business would necessarily be an occupation tax and invalid; on the other hand as to corporations it may be upon the privilege to use the corporate forms0 and
perhaps valid. Though a domestic corporation engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce may not be taxed as to its occupation, yet it may
be as to its corporate franchise.'1
If it be true that the tax is upon the corporate privilege and that
such privilege exists to tax, there is some ground for Mr. Justice
Brandeis' conclusion. It would seem, as he says, that, practically, a
tax on such a corporate privilege is no more directly a burden than a
tax upon property used exclusively in interstate commerce, or upon
net income derived exclusively from interstate commerce. He urges
that "the tax is trifling in amount" and seems to feel that the amount
should be an element in determining whether or not a given tax is a
burden. However, the method of approach has been to decide whether
the burden is direct or indirect, and the Court has fairly consistently
settled this according to the subject matter of the tax; a tax upon certain subjects is indirect and upon others direct. The contention that
the subject of corporate privileges should fall in the indirect class is in
point, but the Supreme Court has not been prone to discuss the amount
of the tax."
The dissenting opinion concludes with the suggestion that to relieve the franchise from this tax means to discriminate against intrastate commerce." That is bound to be true where the burden is the
test; and the only escape would be to make discrimination against in* Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S.
(9o); Pullman Co.
v. Kansas, 216 U. S. s6 (xoio).
See discussion of these cases by Powell,
supra. note 25, 31 HARV. L. REv. 584 eL seq.
" See cases cited supra, note io.
"See supra, note 22.

Schwab v. Richardson, supra, note 9.
See supra, note 25, 32 HARv. L. Rev. 925 et seq., concluding a series'of
articles by Thomas Reed Powell in 31 and 32 HARM. L. REv. on this entire
subject. Also 33 PoI. SCL QUART. .49, 552.
" See supra, note 25, 32 HAlv. L REv. 262.

NOTES

terstate commerce the sole test, i.e., to permit the state to tax so long
as there is no discrimination against interstate commerce. Though
perhaps sometimes less fair in its result, the present test of the burden is doubtless too deeply rooted to be dislodged. In the principal
case, even had the majority viewed the subject of the tax as did Mr.
Justice Brandeis, authority, despite the fallacy in its reasoning, would
probably have led them to conclude that the tax was invalid.

G. S. S.
WHEN MAY INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT BE JUSTIFIED?The concept that procurement of a-breach of contract constitutes a
tort is of comparatively recent development. Before 1853 such procurement was actionable only when it involved the inducing of servants to leave their masters, children to leave their parents, or wives
to leave their husbands, i. e., enticing away dependent members of another's household. The whole action centered around the ancient actio
indirectaof the time of Bracton I and Britton,2 giving damages for loss
of services when a man's household servants were beaten or otherwise
incapacitated. Another action arising out of the Statute of Laborers 2
in 1349 gave a remedy for enticing away another's servants without
pfoof of violence and, since service was under the Statute compulsory,
without proof of any binding contract. Both these were swept into
the maw of the action on the case, and by the end of the eighteenth
century we find the courts allowing an action at common law for the
enticing of another's servant without any proof of violence and with
utter disregard of the origin and ancestry of the action.'
In 1853 the decision of Lumley v. Guy 5 extended the doctrine.

In that case it was held that .one who induced an actress to break her
contract was liable in an action on the case. The actress could not be
called a servant in any sense, but the court applied the doctrine to a
case with the following elements:" (I) Where the defendant's act was
malicious;

(2)

where there existed a valid and binding contract be-

1 3 Bracton, Tr. i. f. uxS. This is probably derived from the action of
the pater familias in the Roman law for the loss of services from his" servants. Cf., Justinian, Institutes, Book IV, tit. 4,. sec. 3.

ai Britton (Nichols) c. 2, f. 52.
Edw. III. See also 25 Edw. 11I.

'23

'See 36 HARV. L- REv. 663, at page 666.
a2 EL & BL z6 (1853).
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tween the plaintiff and the person induced to break it; (3) where
the
contract was one to render exclusive personal services for a specified
period.
For a time the doctrine thus evolved lay in uncertainty, but
in
i88!, in the case of Bowcn v. Hall, it became the undisputed
law of
England. In 1893 the case of Temperton v. Russell 7 extended
the
doctrine to a case where union officers, in order to win an industrial
struggle with the plaintiff, induced his customers to break
their contracts with him. Thus the doctrine was extended even beyond
the
realm of contracts for personal services. Today the-courts
allow the
action regardless of the nature of the contract broken."
From England the doctrine has come to America, and,
while
some states squarely reject it,9 the majority accept it as law
and
apply
it to any kind of contract.10 The courts which so hold say
that the
defendant's act to be actionable must be malicious. But here
again, as
in the cases of defamation, or in the slander of title cases, the
"malice"
does not necessarily mean malevolence but may merely mean
an intentional doing of the act without legal justification or excuse."1
As soon
as the plaintiff proves the injury as the proximate result
of the defendant's act of inducing the breach, a presumption arises
that such
'L R. 6 Q. B. Div. 333 (881).
'[1893] x Q. B. 7i5.

* Quinn v. Leathem, [igol] A. C 495. See also note 62 L
R. A. 68o.
'See for example Bourlier v. McCauley, 91 Ky.
135,
i5
S.
W.
6o (189i);
Swain v. Johnson, 151 N. C. 93, 65 S. E. 6ig (x9o9);
v. Baker, 22
N. D. 386, 134 N. W. 716 (9x). See also McCann v. Sleeper
Wolf, 28 Mo. App.
447 (888); Glencoe Land & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros.
Comm. Co., 138
o. 439, 40 S. W. 93 (1897), (doctrine rejected except where
the relation
of master and servant exists); Kline v. Eubanks, 1o9 La.
241, 33 So. 211
(19o2); Banks v. Eastern Rwy. & L Co., 46 Wash.
61o, go Pac. 1o48
(1907). For the New York view, see 24 CoL. L. REv.
See Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 IIl. 6o8, 52 N. E. i8s.
924
bocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 1o7 Md. 556, 69 (898); KnickerBeekman v. Marsters, 19s Mass. 2o5, 8o N. E- 817 (1907);Ati. 405 (9o3);
Joyce v. Great
Northern Rwy. Co., ioo Minn. 225, iio N. W. 975 (9o7).
See also Angle
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., i51 U. S. i (1893);
notes in ii L. R. A. (N. S.) 2o2; 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 746;and cases cited in
S.) 615; L. R. A. 1915 F io76; 27 Eng Rul. Cas. 108; 97 28 L R. A. (N.
' Walker v. Cronin, 1o7 Mass. 555 (T871); Brennan A. S. R. 9 .
v. United Hatters
of N. A., 7 N. 'J.L 729, 65 Atd. 165 (i9o6) ;Wheeler
Stenzel Co.v. Ame can Window Glass Co., 202 Mass. 471, 89 N. E. 28 (iog1);
Cumberland Glass'
Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, 12o Md. 381, 87 Atl. 27 (1-13). For.
cases see
notes 21 L R. A. 235; 2z Eng. Rul. Cas. 123. it would seem other
cases that malice as alleged is mere surplusage; knowledge from the above
of the contract plus an intention to induce a breach thereof of the existence
seems enough to
establish a prima facie case.

NOTES
act was malicious. The defendant then to rebut that presumption must
show a justification, and his liability depends upon whether that justification is sufficient or not. It is the familiar balancing of interests.
On the one hand we have the so-called absolute rigl-t to contract and
to have those contracts carried out; on the other side there is some
interest which conflicts with that right. The whole case turns on
whether that other individual, or public, interest out-weighs the inviolability of the contract.
In the recent case of Brimelow v. Casson,'" the plaintiff was
manager of a traveling theatrical company paying the girls £I.Io a
week as against £2.I0 a week, the minimum wage set by the Joint
Protection Committee representing five associations of actors and managers. The Committee investigated the plaintiff's business and found
girls in his company living in prostitution because their wages did not
enable them to live decently. To drive the plaintiff out of business
unless he met their requirements as to the minimum wage, the Committee informed theatre managers of the facts and persuaded them to
break their contracts with the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought a bill in
equity to restrain the defendant from interfering with his existing or
prospective contracts, and also prayed for damages suffered from the
breach of contract so induced. There was no evidence that the girls
belonged to any of the unions represented in the Committee nor that
either the plaintiff or the theatre managers belonged to any such union.
It was held that the defendants were justified by their duty to their
profession and to its members and to the public to take all necessary
peaceful steps to terminate the payment of this insufficient wage which
in this case had led to such immoral results.
The first thing to note in this case is that there was no evidence
of any threats or coercion or fraud on the part of the Committee toward the theatre manager. In this class of case, the means used, even
where the end was lawful, have often been the deciding factor in determining liability."'
But granting that the means were lawful and that the end, namely
the betterment of conditions withirf the theatrical profession as a
whole, was lawful, does that end amount to a sufficient justification to
' [1g24] 1

Ch. 302.

'There are certain means that are unlawful per se. As a general proposition, procuring the- breach of the contract by violence either actual or threatened, by fraud, or by defamation, renders the procuror liable, regardless of

the object to be accomplished. See Pollock, Torts (8th ed.) p. 333.
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override the right to contract and to have those contracts carried out?
It would seem right that where one person advises another to break
his contract with a third for the induced one's own betterment, such
disinterested advice should not render the inducer liable unless he uses
unlawful means. 14 On the other hand it is generally held that one may
not induce the breach of an existing contract where this will result in
a benefit to the inducer only. 15 In Brinelow v. Casson, however, the
benefit is not to go to either the induced or the inducer but to a group
entirely separate from either, namely the chorus girls. This case, then,
is the intermediate one. The court's decision holds that each case
should be left to the good sense of the court to analyze the circumstances and to discover on which side of the line each case falls, taking
into account the nature of the contract broken, the position of the
parties to the contract, the grounds for the breach, the means employed, and the object of the person in procuring the breach. Then
stressing the lurid facts the court decides that since the ultimate object
was to correct a revolting eVil, the defendants, to accomplish that end,
were justified in using the only legal means within their power,
namely, persuading the theatre manager to break his contract with the
plaintiff.
Whether the case will be followed or not is, of course, a matter
of uncertainity. The problem involved in all such cases of justification is the balancing of conflicting interests. Fundamentally the relative importance of each of these depends upon the social and economic
conditions of the times. In this case the court evidently considered
that the correction of this evil was of more social importance to the
community at large than the inviolability of this contract. A possible
'Thus a lawyer is not liable for advice given to his clients nor a doctor
for advising his patients. Similarly, where one persuades another not to go
into an unhealthful country although the induced is under contract to go;
also a father may persuade his child to break a known existing engagement
to marry. See Homan v. Hall, io2 Neb. 70, i65 N. W. 881 (917); Guida v.
Pontrelli, 1i4 Misc. 181, z86 N. Y. Supp. 147 (92); Overhultz v. Row, 152
La. 9, 92 So. 716 (1922). See notes 16 L R. A. (N. S.) 749; 2 Ann. Cas.
443; I British Rul. Cas. 2o.
' For example it is a general principle that freedom for fair competition is guaranteed for all, even though this competition results in the ruin
of a competitor's business and the loss of all his property, but this right of
competition, which is nothing more than the right to promote one's own interests, does not justify one in inducing another to break his 'existing contract with a third person. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co.,
,supra, note Ii; Beekman v. Marsters, supra, note ii; South Wales Miners'
Fed. v. Glamorgan Coal Co.. figo5] A. C. 239. See also notes x6 L R. A.
(N. S.) 746; zx L R. A. (N. S.) 2ol; x British RuL Cas. x.
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reason for so holding is that the court is unconsciously reflecting the,
the
trend of public sentiment toward the laboring classes. In England
been
has
years
few
problem of an over-supply of labor during the past
the emof paramount importance. With such a condition prevalent,
as to
dictate
to
ployer class has correspondingly increased its power
the
on
wages, hours, and working conditions generally; the workers,
other hand, have been compelled to remain in jobs which give them
barely enough to eke out a living. As a result, the pendulum of public
sentiment has swung in their direction and the tendency is to endorse
6
anything which will better their condition.
If that is the solution, it is quite possible that a different result
would be reached in America where there is normally no such dearth
of employment and where public sentiment is not so aroused. In
America the laws of supply and demand would correct the evil, and it
seems probable that the courts would hold such an attempt on the part
of an individual, or a group of individuals, to correct it, could not
justify inducing the breach of a contract between an employer and a
third person.
The test in such cases, as 'announced and followed by this court,
namely that of analyzing the circumstances of each case and of balancing the facts to determine whether the defendant was justified in
inducing the breach, while having an unfortunate result in leaving the
law uncertain, seems to be the only satisfactory means of determining
justification. Conflicting interests must be weighed; one must give
way to the other in order to promote the general welfare; and the determination of which is to give way depends on the particular circumstances of each case..
J.C.H.
DoEs AssIGNMENT

OF A LIFE INSURANCE

POLICY BY YHF

life
assumed
has
insurance is of a comparatively modem development, and
such proportions that it has become insulated from the law of ordinary
contracts, and has really become a branch of law in itself. One of the
most interesting features of a life insurance policy is the beneficiary
clause, and this clause, being such an integral part of the policy, has
achieved such recognized importance that even those jurisdictions
INSURED EFFECT A CHANGE IN THE BENEFICIARY?-The law of

A good example of which is the secondary boycott which is legal in
England while, in most American jurisdictions, it is tabooed.
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which still adhere strictly to the common law rule excluding third
party beneficiaries, have found means of enforcing such clauses in
favor of the beneficiary.'
When one is named as beneficiary of a policy, he thereby acquires
eo instanti-a vested right in the policy, which cannot be subsequently
revoked or assigned without his consent.2 If, however, the policy reserves to the insured the power to change the beneficiary at will, then
the latter's right is at best, a "defeasible vested interest", which is
subject to the whim and caprice of the insured, who can destroy or
impair it without the beneficiary's consent or even without his knowledge.4 In considering policies containing such a clause, an interesting
question arises as to what effect an assignment by the insured of his
interest in the policy has upon such divestible right. Does such an
assignment operate as a substitution of the assignee as beneficiary?
The courts do not seem to be harmonious on the question.
5
a life policy was
In a recent case, lerchants' Bank v. Garrard,
assigned as collateral for a debt of the insured. The court reached
the conclusion that this in effect was a substitution of the assignee as
beneficiary,. even though the policy provided in separate clauses both
for an assignment and a change in beneficiary, thus recognizing a difference between the two, and also in view of the fact that the insured
made no express attempt to change such beneficiary.6 The court, while
admitting that "there is plausibility in the view that the mere assignment by the insured of his right, title, and interest in a policy, when
'This has been accomplished in England by statute, 45 and 46 Vict., C.
75, sec. ii; in Massachusetts, also by statute, Mass. R. L. i9io, c. xz8, sec.
73. Other jurisdictions have achieved similar results without the aid of
statutes. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Devine, iSo Ill. App. 422
(1913) ; Filley v. Insurance Co., 9t Kan. 22o, 137 Pac. 793 (914);

Mutual

Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Swett, z22 Fed. 2oo (C. C. A., 1915).
'Ricker v. Insurance Co., 27 Minn. x93. 6 N. W. 771 088o); Wilburn v.
Wilburn, 83 Ind. 55 (188) ; Glanz v. Gloeckler, 104 Iil. 573 (1882) ; Central
Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195 (x888); Atkins v. Atkins, 7o
Vt. 565, 41 Atl. 5o3 (x89S); Entwhistle v. Insurance Co., 202 Pa. 141, 51
AtI. 759 (19o2); Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Me. 578, 55 AtI. 52o (19o3).
'Williston on Contracts, sec. 369.
'Luhrs v. Luhrs. 123 N. Y. 367, 25 N. E. 388 (89o) ; Isgrigg v. Schooley,
Ind. 94, 25 N. E. 151 (iSo) ; Wirgman v. Miller, 98 Ky. 62o, 33 S. W.
925 (1905).
Also see.
Cooley: Briefs on the Law of Insurance, 3755.
125

189, 75 N. E.
937 (1896); Freuna v. Freund, 218 111.
S 124 S. E. 71S (Ga., 1924).

'This assignment provided, however, that the assignee was to take as its
interest appeared, and that the remainder was to go to the then-named beneficiary.

NOTES

both he and the beneficiary have distinct interests thereunder, does not
amount to a substitution of the beneficiary",' yet declared that the
assignment in question was so comprehensive that it was intended to
effect a change in the beneficiary, although not effected in strict accordance with the provisions of the policy. This decision was based
on the 'Massachusetts case of Atlantic Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.

Gannon.8 But in the latter case it did not appear that the policy contained an assignment clause, and if this was so, then the most reasonable construction would apparently be that it was intended to effect a
change in the beneficiary. In both of these cases, the assignment was
also of "all benefit and advantage", and the presence of such wording
in the assignment was deemed indicative of an intention to substitute
the assignee as beneficiary.
An opposite result has been reached in New Jersey in the case of
Sullivan v. Maroncy, in which the court said: "There were, therefore, always two sets of interests in this policy-the beneficiaries (who
could get the money if they were living at the death of the insured),
and the representatives of the insured (to whom the money would
come if the insured outlived the beneficiaries). Each of these interests was undoubtedly the subject of assignment. Neither one could,
in my view, assign anything excepting that which would come to that
one; and the assignment of neither could possibly impinge upon the
rights of the other." 10 This case was followed by that of Anderson v.
Broad Street National Bank,"' in which the court explained its decision by declaring that "This result does not effectuate the intention of
the parties to the assignment whose obvious purpose was, as it was in
the Sullivan case, to transfer the entire property in the policy. But it
must be borne in mind that the relations of the parties to the policies
are purely contractual and alterable only according to their terms,
and, as the available means for effectuating the intention were not "employed, it is not within the power of the court to supply the deficiency."

12

'Mr. Justice Hines, at page 78.

a 179 Mass. 291, 6o N. E. 933 (igoi).
' 76 N. J. Eq. io4, 73 Atl. 842, affirmed in 77 N. J. Eq. 565, 78 At. iso

(igio).
est .

The assignment in this case was of "all my right, title, and inter-

. . and all money which may be payable under same."

Garrison, V. C, at page io8.

go N. J. Eq. 78, 105 Atl. s99 (1918).
"Backes, V. C., at page 83.
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The ratio decidendi of the Sullivan case may be explained by the
failure properly to distinguish between vested and divestible interests.
The court seems to have regarded both as being vested from the moment of their inception. Proceeding from this premise, of course,
the conclusion is irresistible, that since the assignor can assign only
that which he has,18 such assignment cannot effect a change .in the
beneficiary. Logically, under this reasoning, it would seem to follow
that a beneficiary, once named, could not be changed without his consent, but neither the Sullivan case nor the Anderson case is prepared
to go this far, and both recognize that a beneficiary may be changed,
but only after the provisions of the policy regarding such change have
been meticulously complied with.
Therefore, it would appear that the rule of these two cases 14
sacrifices substance for form, and also rests upon a misconception of
the beneficiary's interest. The latter's interest is a right only as long
as its creator, the insured, cares to foster it. While it is .true that
there are two interests under the policy, as was observed in the Sullivan case, yet they are interests depending solely upon the will of the
insured, in whom remains the power of control. When the insured
executes an assignment, it is an exercise of his power of control, the
intention of which may, or may not be, to transfer the entire property
in the policy to the assignee free from all claims of the named beneficiary. There would seem to be no reason, either in principle or authority, why, as against a volunteer, the donor's intention to impair an
unperfected gift should not be effectuated merely because it does not
conform to the procedure prescribed in the contract creating it. The
provisions of the policy setting forth the method to be pursued in
effecting a change of the beneficiary are for the benefit of the company, which the latter may waive,"8 and since the beneficiary is neither
Johnson v. Insurance Co., 6 Colo. 178, 138 Pac. 44 (1914). In this
case, however, the assignment was gratuitous, and no notice whatsoever was
ever given to the company.
14The following cases have been frequently cited as following this rule:
Indiana National Life Insurance Co. v. McGinnis, i8o Ind. 9, ioi N. E. 289
(1913); Muller v. Insurance Co., 6z Colo. 245, 161 Pac. 148 (1916). In this
latter case the assignment was only of the insured's right, title, and interest.
Douglass v. Life Assurance Soc., i5o La. Si, go So. 834 (1922) (two dissents)
In Schoenholz v. Insurance Co., 234 N. Y. 24, 136 N. F. 227 (1922), the
assignment was by parol, and the provisions of the policy were flagrantly
ignored.
'Keating v. Roclhill, 78 Pa. Super. 139 (192r). In Penna. IL R. Co.
v. Wolfe, 2o3 Pa. A, 275, 52 Atd. 247 (19o2), the filing of an interpleader
by the insur.nce company was held to be such a waiver.

NOTES

a party to such contract nor possesses any vested rights thereunder, he
should not be able to raise any objection to the waiver. The Anderson
case either does not recognize the right of parties to a contract mutually 4o modify or waive its terms, or else regards the beneficiary as
being a person privy to the contract, %vhomust be first consulted before its conditions may be changed, which is not the case. Where the
insured has indicated his intention of changing the beneficiary by virtue of his assignment,1 then there should be no reason why equity
should not consider done that which ought to be done,1T and declare
that the assignment was in effect a change in the beneficiary.
It would further seem, therefote, that the entire question as to
the effect of an assignment should be dependent upon the intention of
the insured, and that the courts should give effect to this intention as
in Merchant? Bank v. Garrard.1 If it appears that the insured's intention is only to assign the right of his estate to the proceeds in event
that the beneficiary predeceases him, and not the absolute right to the
proceeds of the policy upon his death, then such assignment should
not be regarded as a change in the beneficiary. In policies containing
an endowment clause, by which the insured is entitled to the entire
proceeds of the policy if he survives a certain period, usually twenty
years, the intention often appears not to assign the right to the proceeds upon his death, but only the right of the insured to the proceeds
if he is living at the end of the endowment term, 1 ' in which case, also,
an assignment should not be considered as a substitution of the assignee as beneficiary. But if the intention clearly appears that the
insured means to assign any and all rights to the proceeds absolutely,
but through a mere inadvertence, fails to perfect a formal change of
the beneficiary, then the assignment should nevertheless be regarded
1

In Barner v. Lyter, 3! Pa. Super. 435 (i9o6), the burden of proof
was upon the assignee to show that the assignment was intended to take
effect as a change in the beneficiary, although it was strongly intimated that
a mere failure to have the change of beneficiary indorsed on the policy would
not be fatal.
"Penna. IR PL Co. v. Wolfe, supra. There is strong dicta to this effect
in Schoenholz v. Insurance Co., supra.
'The rule of this case has also been followed in the following cases:
Atlantic Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Gannon, supra; Martin v. Stubbings. 126 Ill. 387, 18 N. E. 657 (888); Mente v. Townsend, 68 Ark. 39x, 59
S. W. 41 (i9oo); Crice v. Life Insurance Co., 122 Ky. 572, 92 S. W. 56o

(i9o6) ; Mutual Benefit IUfe Ins. Co. v. Swett, supra.
1

'Deal v. Deal, 87 S. C. 395, 69 S. E. 886 (19o).
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as such a change. When the latter intention is clearly manifested, the
rule applied in the New Jersey cases is too inflexible, and does not
beget substantive justice. It is inconceivable that any bank would be
willing to advance a large sum of money 20 merely on the possibility of
the beneficiary predeceasing the insured, particularly in those cases
where the insured is past middle age and the beneficiary an infant, and
to refuse to execute the intention of the insured under the circumstances would be most unjust.
The case of Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swelt,2 1 reached the
same result as was reached in Merchants' Bank v. Garrard,but by
different reasoning. There the interest of the beneficiary was deemed
to be not even a divestible right but a mere expectancy ripening into a
right only upon the death of the insured; consequently if the insured
assigned his interest in the meantime, then the beneficiary took only
what the insured was able to give upon his death, and therefore only
as much of the proceeds of the policy as had not already been exhausted by prior assignment. The reasoning of this case W*,ould seem
to be questionable, however, since by the weight of authority, 22 the
beneficiary doeg have a right, although a defeasible one, and not a
mere expectancy.
In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that the question as to
whether an assignment of the insured's interest in a life insurance
policy is in effect a change in the beneficiary should be in every case
dependent solely upon the intention of the insured, an intention which
the failure to conform to certain pure formalities should not be permitted to contravene, an intention which the courts should effectuate.
J. S. C. Jr.
THE CIvIL LIABILITY OF A DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR QUASI-

AcTs.-The exemption of judges from civil liability for judicial acts is to be found in the earliest judicial records in England I

JUDICIAL

" In Merchants' Bank v. Garrard, a $io,ooo policy was assigned to secure
a debt of the insured's of approximately the same amount, while in Anderson
v. Bank, $8oo was advanced on the policy.

=Supra.
"See note 4.

'For a comprehensive survey of the earlier English cases see Chief Justice Kent's opinion in Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291 (N. Y., I8xo), the
leading case in this country until its holdings were approved and restated by
the United States Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1871).

NOTES
and was early recognized in this country. The reasons for this privileged position in which the judiciary are placed have been varyingly
stated. Nearly all of them, however, are based on broad grounds of
public policy, having in view the adequacy of criminal punishment for
any breach of duty and the necessity of preserving the independence
of the courts. 2
The earlier cases made a distinction between judges having a
general jurisdiction and those of limited or inferior jurisdiction.
Members of the former class were held exempt from liability for all
acts, even if in excess of their jurisdiction, except where there was
not even "color of jurisdiction"; ' whereas inferior judges were generally held liable wherever it later developed that they had no jurisdiction, even if the determination of that jurisdiction had been a matThe earliest reported case on this subject seems to have been Floyd v. Barker,
12 Coke 23 (i6o8), where it was held that a judge of the realm could not be
held civilly liable for falsification of records. For other English cases in
accord as to various judicial acts see: Aise v. Sedgwick. 2 Rolle, Rep. 197;
Hamond v. Howell, i Mod. 184; Grenville v. College of Physicians, 12 Mod.
386; Taafe v. Downes. 3 Moo. P. C. C. 36 (Court of Common Pleas in Ireland, 1813); Haggart's Trustees v. Lord President, 2 Sh. Sc. App. 125
(1824) ; Fray v. Blackburn, 3 Best & S. 576 (1863) ; Scott v. Stansfield, L.
R. 3 Exch. 219 (1868). As to an ecclesiastical judge, see Ackcrley v. Parkinson, 3 M. & S.411 (18x5).
'Although this view represents the great weight of authority, it is interesting to note that in England in the earliest reported case by Lord Coke
(see note x, supra) the court also emphasized the position of the judges as
King's officers, and stressed the point that they could be made responsible only
to the King himself:
"and the reason why a Judge . . . shall not be drawn in question
before any other Judge is: for this the King himself is de jure to deliver
justice to all his subjects . . , he delegates his power to his Judges
and there is great reason that the King himself shall take account of it
and no other."

This view was approved as late as i9o7, in McCreadie v. Thomson, 14 Scots
L T. 968; i5Scots L. T. 216, but has not been applied to other appointees
of the King, such as sheriffs. For other oft-quoted statements of the reasons
for judicial exemption see Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, at 348 (187);
Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N. J. L. 654, at 656 (£882) ; and collection of cases

in 44 L R. A. (N. S.) 164; z5 IL C. L 543; and 33 C. J. 981.
'The distinction between acts "in excess of jurisdiction" and acts "without color of jurisdiction" is well defined in Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268,
57 So. 860 (1912), and in Bradley v. Fisher. supra, at p. 349. It may be said
generally that a judge acts in excess of his jurisdiction where he has jurisdiction over the subject matter but acts beyond his authority in a particular
case. On the other a 'judge can only be said to be acting in the absence of all
jurisdiction where there are no facts present which raise the question of
jurisdiction, or where the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge.
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ter of grave doubt." The unwise and unfair character of this principle has been gradually recognized and most courts now protect these
judges where they have made bona fide mistakes as to their jurisdiction. 5 There is a definite tendency in this country to go still further
and grant to members of the minor judiciary the same immunity, as
judges of general jurisdiction, giving them protection wherever there
are present facts which raise the slightest possibility that they have
jurisdiction over the case, without regard to the motives which may
produce the decision." In England the inferior judiciary are
civilly liable whenever they act without jurisdiction, even under a
bona fide mistake of law," and they are similarly liable if they have
jurisdiction over the subject matter but act maliciously and corruptly.$
This latter view has never obtained in this country.'
The gradual extension of almost complete civil exemption has
'Cooley has given the reason for this distinction as follows: "The inferior
judicial officer is not excused for exceeding his jurisdiction because a limited
authority only having becn conferred upon him. he best observes the spirit of
the law by solving all questions of doubt against his jurisdiction. If he
errs in this direction, no harm is done, because he can always be set right
by the court having appellate authority over him . . ." Cooley on Torts
(3d ed.), 8i. As to what are superior and inferior courts, see Newell, Malicious Prosecution, sec. 5o-52.
aGrove v. Van Duyn, 44 N. J. L. 654 (1882): t . . . the jurisdictional
test of the measure of judicial responsibility must be rejected." See also
citations in note 6, infra.
' "In the later cases a clear tendency has been evident to abolish alto-.
aether the discrimination between judges of different rank." ii R. C. L.
815. For further discussion see notes in 5 MINx. L REv. 482; 88 Central L
J. 396; and 44 L R. A. (N. S.) 167. See also Broom v. Douglass, upra,
note 3; and Calhoun v. Little, io6 Ga. 336, 32 S. E. 86 (x898).
'Wingate v. Waite, 6 M. & W. 739 (i84o); Houlden v. Smith, L. R. 14
Q. B. 841 (185o) ; Quinn v. Pratt, [19o8] 2 . R. 69. Cf. Calder v. Hackett,
3 Moore P. C. C. 28 (1839), where the assumption of jurisdiction was due to
a mistake of fact and the judge was held not liable. Cf. also Mills v. Collett,
6 Bing. 8s (1829), accord. The Justices' Protection Act, i & 12 Vict., e. 44,
permits a civil action for acts outside of a justice's jurisdiction without any
allegation of malice or want of a probable cause. See also 1a & 13 Vict.,
c. 16. For further discussion of liability of the minor judiciary in England
see note, ig Juridical Rev. 281.
*Pease v. Chaytor. 3 B. & S. 62o, 639 (1863) ; Johnston v. Meldon, L. R.
30 Ir. x5 (iSgi). In Polley v. Fordham, 2o Times L. R. 639 (19o3), Alverston, C. J., discusses the statute referred to in note 7, supra, and points outthat it is necessary to allege malice and lack of probable cause to support an
action against a magistrate for an act within his jurisdiction.
'Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Detio 117 (N. Y, 1846). See collected cases
in 137 Am. St. Rep. 49.

NOTES

proceeded more slowly in the case of quasi-judicial 10 officers than in
the case of the inferior judiciary. It is not within the scope of this
note to deal with the numerous and varied examples of delegated judicial power."
The same principles should apply to all when once
quasi-judicial character of the power has been established, and this has
been generally recognized, though different degrees of protection have
been granted in different jurisdictions.1 2 The particular problem with
which this note is concerned and the one which has in recent years

given rise to an increasing amount of litigation is the degree of protection which will be accorded a District Attorney in the institution of
criminal proceedings. Although the exact duties of the District Attomey vary somewhat in different states, the commencement of criminal proceedings in the great majority of jurisdictions is a discretionary matter with him." It is in the making of this decision, which the
courts have unanimously classed as a quasi-judicial act, that the District Attorney has invariably been granted a certain degree of exemp"Quasi-judicial

is a term used to describe acts presumed to be the prod-

uct of judgment based upon evidence either oral or visual or both. There is
a distinction between acts that are quasi-judicial and those that are purely
judicial. . . . A quasi-judicial duty is one lying in the judgment of an
officer other than a judicial officer." 34 C. J. ii8o. "When the term (judicial) is used to describe the official character of the person assuming to act,
the fact that public officers or agents exercise judgment or discretion in the
performance of their duties does not make their action judicial in character;
the act must be performed by a court or judge in the exercise of a duty
or power, appropriate and appertaining to his judicial office." 34 C. J.1'78.
'For discussion of immunity of quasi-judicial officers, generally, see 3
MiNN. L Rv. 515, and Newell on .Malicious Prosecution; sec. 68.
"The same reasons of private interest and public policy which operate to

render the judicial officer exempt' from civil liability for his judicial acts

within his jurisdiction . . . apply to the officer who exercises judicial
functions although not as a part of a regularly established court, and to whom
therefore the name quasi-judicial has been applied." Mechem on Agency,
2d ed., sec. 1497, and collected cases. There is a minority view contra:
Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 491 (1869).
' The discretionary nature of a Diftrict Attorney has been generally recognized. For well-stated descriptions of his responsibility, see Weeks on
Attorneys at Law (2d ed.), sec. 282 (a); Engle v. Chipman, St Mich. 524,
i6 N. W. 886 (1883); Commonwealth v. Nicely, 13o Pa. 261, 18 AUt. 737
(i889). In his decisions as to the prosecution of cases Iiis duties are closely
analogous to those of a grand juror. It is well established that a grand
juror is not liable in a civil proceeding for his actions as a juror regardless
of how erroneous or malicious they may be. Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23
(i6o8); Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356 (1872); Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65
(i88o) ; Sidener v. Russell, 34 Ill.
App. 446 (i8go) ; see note, 12 Am. St. Rep.
99. But where, the grand juror acts outside of his authority, he is civilly
liable. Allen v. Gray, ii Conn. 95 (1836).
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tion from private damage suits."4 A brief review of the cases will illustrate the various conclusions which have been reached.
What seems to be the earliest case directly raising the question of
the civil liahility of a District Attorney is Griffith v. Slinkard.5 The
plaintiff there alleged that the defendant procured an indictment maliciously and without probable cause. The defendant demurred. The
court sustained the demurrer, taking the view that the institution of
criminal proceedings was a "judicial determination" in which a District Attorney is protected no matter how malicious his motives. The
one case '6 cited by the court for the proposition above stated did not
deal with this question at all but was concerned solely with the necessity of proving a conspiracy and with the effect of a judgment against
the plaintiff in the lower court under the indictment of which he complained.
A well-considered recent case upholding the doctrine of Griffith
v. Slinkard is Snitlh v. Parnia." The plaintiff alleged that the District Attorney had instituted a criminal action against him "with
malice and without probable cause." The court held that the plaintiff
had not stated a good cause of action, on the ground that a District
Attorney was a quasi-judicial officer and entitled to the same protection as judicial officers in the exercise of his judicial powers. Mason,
J., in his opinion said: "We think the reason for granting immunity
to judges' and grand jurors applies with practically equal force to a
public prosecutor in his relations to actions to punish infractions of
the law."
The contrary view has been taken in two cases. In Skeffington
v. Eyhward,1s the chairman of a board of town supervisors whose
official duty was to prosecute all persons violating the provisions of a
T4InCarpenter v. Sibley, 153 Cal. 215, 94 Pac. 879 (9o8),
a judgment
against a District Attorney and several others in an action for malicious
prosecution was sustained by the Supreme Court. However. in this case no
exemption was claimed by the District Attorney and the point was not r-ied
by the court. Cf. Arnold v. Bubble, iS Ky. L Rep. 947, 38 S. W. o41
(1.'97"), where a petition'which failed to allege malice and corrupt motives
was held insufficient against a District Attorney. See also Farrar v. Steele,
31 La. Ann. 64o (1879). holding that. where a District Attorney acted within
his jurisdiction, his motives could not be questioned. Under the facts of the
case the court saw no damage to defendant in the District Attorney's actiofis.
s146 Ind. 117, 44 N. E. iooI (1896).
'*Parker v. Huntingdon, 2 Gray 14 (Mass., x854).
iIo0 Kan. iii, 165 Pac. 663 (1917).
i97 Minn. 244, 105 N. W. 6,38 (19o6).
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statute relating to the obstruction of public highways, was held liable
for instituting an action against the plaintiff maliciously and without
probable cause. The court gave no reasons and cited no authority for
this holding. In Leong Yan v. Carden, 9 a complaint was held sufficient alleging that the defendant, a District Attorney, instituted a suit
against the plaintiff with malice and without probable cause. The
court expressly doubted the rule laid down by Griffith v. Slinkard,2 0
and, after citing Skeffington v. Eylward,"1 said: "A public prosecuting officer, in determining whether certain purported facts which have
been brought to his attention justify the accusation and prosecution of
a person believed to have committed an offense, acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity, and he is not to be held liable in damages for an honest mistake or error of judgment in instituting a criminal proceeding against
such person. But if he prosecutes without probable cause and with
malice he certainly is in no better position than the judge of-a court,
superior or inferior, who proceeds maliciously and without any jurisdiction, or the head of an executive department who acts maliciously
and without color of authority."
The court's premise seems sound and in accord with the weight
of authority, but its conclusion that a prosecution "without probable
cause" is analogous to a judge's act "without any jurisdiction," or a
quasi-judicial act "without color of authority," seems doubtful. The
fact that a jury might subsequently determine that the facts presented
to the District Attorney did not constitute "probable cause" would not
conclusively determine that such facts would not give rise to some
small particle of suspicion, sufficient to invoke the District Attorney's
authority to exercise his quasi-judicial discretion, and to accord him
the civil protection which accompanies the employment of that discretion.
The case of Schneider v. Shepard 22 is sometimes cited as authority in accord with Leong You v. Carden. However, in this case
the complaint was based on an unwarranted arrest and the court expressly took the view that in ordering private investigations, and making arrests without a warrant, the defendant was not exercising his
quasi-judicial powers or any authority received as District Attorney
is23 How. 362 (x916).
"Supra, note i5.
' Supra, note AS.

x92 Mich. 82, 1$8 N. W. 182 (1g16).
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and that in such acts he was entitled to no more protection than a
private citizen.
The most recent case is that of Watts v. Gcrking.2s The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, a District Attorney, had maliciously instituted an a tion against the plaintiff knowing that the plaintiff was innocent of the charge made. The District Attorney demurred. In the
first argument before the Supreme Court of Oregon "4the demurrer
was overruled, the court holding that when a District Attorney has
no ground for believing an offense has been committed he has no
authority or color of authority and is in the same situation as a judge
who acts wholly without authority of law on a subject matter over
which he knows he has no jurisdiction. On reargument the court
reversed itself and sustained the demurrer, Justices Rand and Burnett
dissenting. Both the majority and dissenting opinions acknowledged
the immunity of a District Attorney for quasi-judicial acts within
his authority. The majority, taking the view that the filing of criminal complaints was within the "jurisdiction" of a District Attorney,
held that the District Attorney was not liable therefor no matter how
malicious his motives or baseless the charge, while the dissenting
justices adhered to the former opinion given on the first argument,
that the immunity from a civil suit did not extend to charges made
against a man who is known to be innocent.
It is necessary before analyzing this decision further to distinguish between the court's use of the word "jurisdiction" and "authority." Although we find the two words used interchangeably
throughout these cases, it seems clearly established that jurisdiction
in its proper legal sense refers to a special kind of authority an authority to try..2 Strictly it cannot be properly said that a District Attorney has jurisdiction, though it is generally admitted that he has
authority of a judicial nature, quasi-judicial authority. In matters
over which he has authority the District Attorney should be protected
in the same degree as the judge in matters over which he has jurisdiction. Similarly where the problem is one of determination of authority, the same rules should he applied as govern the determination of

135 (Ore., z924).
Pac. 38 (Ore., z24).

"228 Pac.
2

""Jurisdiction-.the right to adjudicate concerning the subject-matter in
the given case." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. 11, Vi. 57. See Cooley,
Torts (3d ed.), sec. 487.
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jurisdiction by the judiciary.
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It is not necessary that the District

Attorney should have probable or reasonable grounds for instituting

suit but it is necessary that he have samw grounds, some "color of authority." If he has no grounds for his assumption of authority over
a prosecution he is in no better position than a judge who assumes
dominion over a case known to him to be completely out of his jurisdiction.
Applying this reasoning to the case of Watts v. Gerking, it seems
clear that the dissenting view represents the sounder law. It can
scarcely be contended, when it is admitted on demurrer that the District Attorney knew the plaintiff was innocent of the charge made,
that the District Attorney was acting with even "color of authority" in
its most liberal sense. Consequently it would seem that the District
Attorney in this case was not entitled to don the cloak of judicial
exemption to deprive the plaintiff of the right to damages for malicious and unwarranted acts so clearly outside his official duties.
W.J.M.
MISREPRESENTATION OF LAW AS ACTIONABLE

FL.xum.-The gen-

erally accepted principle seems to be that an action for fraud or deceit
must be predicated upon a misrepresentation of fact, and not of law.,
This doctrine seems to have become so settled in the law that practically every case in which the question of fraud is discussed commences its discussion of that subject with this premise The reason
usually given for the rule is that as every one is presumed to know the
law, in legal contemplation he cannot be deceived by what others state
with reference to it.3 This presumption of knowledge of the law is
evidently an absolute and irrebuttable one, for it does not appear that
the party asserting the fraud will be permitted to prove that in point
of fact he was altogether ignorant as to the point of law involved in
the misrepresentation.'
'26 C. J. 1207; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jur. (3d ed.), sec. 876; Colley, Torts
(3d ed.), 928
'See Rasdall v. Ford, L R. 2 Eq. 750, 35 L J. Ch. 769 (x866); Burt
v. Bowles, 69 Ind. I (1879); Wicks v. Metcalf, 83 Ore. 687, 163 Pac. 434

(1917).

"Fish v. Cleland, 33
283

11. 238 (1864) ; ;Etna Ins. Co. v. Reed, ? Ohio St.
(1877); Rogan i. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 93 II. App. 39 (19oo),

affirmed x94 Ill. 6oo (igo2).
'Supra, note 3.
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On principle it would appear that there should be no distinction
made between misstatements of fact or of law,' where their effect is
to cause another to rely thereon to his prejudice, and where the statement was made with that end in view. The deceit perpetrated is as
complete and damaging in the one case as in the other. However, it
has been urged that there is some public policy which demands tlat
representations as to what the law is should be placed in a different
category, and should be treated not as the assertion of a fact, but as a
mere matter of opinion," so as to deny to-the party claiming to be aggrieved any legal redress. A public policy which runs so directly
counter to principle deserves further analysis and consideration.
Lord Ellenbrough expressed this public policy when he said:
"Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise there
is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance might be carried.
It would be urged in almost every case." ' This learned justice, it must
be remembered, had had long experience in the criminal courts, and
undoubtedly was referring to the rule that obtained there that "ignorantiajuris non excusat." However, he was deciding a civil case I
at the time, and his decision apparently stands for the position that the
rule in civil and criminal actions is and should be the same. Public
policy no doubt demands that one who has been guilty of wrongdoing
should not be permitted to absolve himself by pleading ignorance
thereof, but is there the same necessity for the rule when a party who
has been innocent of any wrongdoing, but in fact has had a wrong
perpetrated upon him, seeks to have the one who has wronged him
make him whole? The proposition is doubtful, as is also the public
policy which permits such a result.
The leading case in this country on this subject is probably that
of Upton v. TribilcockO in which the defendant was induced to make
a subscription to stock upon the representation that the word "non'Per Nisbet, I., in Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64 (1849): "The doctrine has never been defended on principle, but on policy."
'Jaggard, Torts, 581; Star v. Bennett, 5 Hill 3o3 (N. Y., 1843), where
a misrepresentation by a sheriff that a writ of execution was- in "due form of
law" was treated as an expression of opinion.
' Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469 (8o2).
' Supra, note 7. This was an action to recover money paid under mistake of law. Recovery was refused. See also Lowrie v. Bourdieu, 2 Dougl.
K. B. 468 (1780).
'99 U. S. 45 (1875).
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assessable" on the stock certificate meant that he would be liable only
for twenty per cent. of the amount of the stock in question. Being
sued for the remaining eighty per cent, he set up this representation.
The court held that there was no misrepresentation of any fact, but
only as to the legal liability incurred by the subscription, and, upon the
principle that "the law is presumed to be equally within the knowledge
of all parties," held the defendant liable for the balance of the subscription."'
The principle in question has found little favor with the textwriters," and with many of the courts. 12 Exceptions and subterfuges
have been resorted to in order to mitigate the harshness of the rule.
Thus it has been held that relief will be given where it appears that
confidential relations existed between the parties ;1 or where it appeared that the one making the misrepresentation of law took advantage of the ignorance and illiteracy of the other party in order to
impose upon him.1'
The recent tendency, however, seems to be to treat what are usually regarded as statements of legal conclusions as statements of
"For further cases holding that misrepresentation as to the legal effect
of an instrument does not constitute fraud, see Wicks v. Metcalf, supra,
note 2; Burt v. Bowles, supra, note 2. Cooley, Torts (3d ed.), 928.
'Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, sec. 36; Clark, Torts, 94, note 2; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jur., see. 847.

" The rule in question is particularly unpopular in equity courts. Broughton v. Hutt, 3 De G. & J.So (1858) ; Schaeffer v. Blanc, 87 S. W. 745 (Tex-,
i9os); Holt v. Gordon, 176 S. W. 9o (Tex., 1915). In Moreland v. Atchison,
19 Tex. 303 (1857), a misrepresentation to one who had just come into Aexas as to
the law in that state was held a misrepresentation of fact, the law of Texas
being foreign law to the one to whom the statement was made. A misrepresentation of foreign law is deemed a misrepresentation of fact. See 2 Co.
L Rxv. 591.
'Townsend & Milliken v. Cowles, 31 Ala. 428 (1858) ; Champion v. Woods,
79 Cal. 17, 21 Pac. 534 (889); Busieri v. Reilly, x89 Mass. 518, 75 N. E. 958

(i0os).
" Decker v. Hardin, 5 N. J. L 579 (x8ig), note represented to be legally
binding given in payment of a purchase to one unable to read; Merchants &
Farmers Bank v. Cleland, 25 Ky. L. Rep. i69, 77 S. W. 176 (x9o3), a representation that note was not binding made to woman of little business experience; Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., i49 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1o67
(x9o8), meaning of clause in life insurance policy misinterpreted to insured

-who was blind.
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facts.' The stat.ement of Jessel, M.R., that "it is not the less a statement of fact that in order to arrive at it you must know more or less
of the law," "' has emboldened some courts to take this view. Thus in
Kerr v. Shurtleff,' 7 where the action was in deceit for falsely representing that a college could give the plaintiff a certain degree in three
years, this was held to be a statement of fact, although it "involved a
question of law." In that case a ruling of the trial court that "a sinsstatement of law cannot form the basis of any action for deceit" was
termed error, the appellate court saying, "It is still an open question
here whether an action for a false representation of law will lie."

It can probably be said with safety that the time is approaching
when the courts will do directly what they have been doing indirectly,
and unequivocally hold that, if all the other essential elements are
present, an action will lie regardless of whether the misrepresentation
is one of fact or of law. The recent case of Fainardiv. Pausatae' reinforces this hope. There the plaintiffs were induced to purchase the
soda business of the defendant by the representation of the latter that
he had a license to manufacture a certain soft drink in a particular
kind of bottle."1 There was a statute in the state making it unlawful
to use this kind of bottle. Hence the representation was as to the

legal authority to do what the defendant claimed could be done, and
was clearly one of law. 20

The court held the defendant liable in

deceit, treating the representation as one clearly actionable.'
' Brown v. Rice, 26 Grat. 467 (Va., 1875), bond secured from administrator by representing certain notes of deceased to be legally binding; Westervelt v. Demarest, 46 N. J. L. 37 (1884), director of a savings bank published
a statement that directors and stockholders were personally liable for debts;
Harris-Emery Co. v. Pitcairn, 122 Iowa 595, 98 N. W. 476 (9o4), plaintiff
induced to take irsurance policy by misrepresentation of the powers of the
company; Myers v. Lowery, 46 Cal. App. 682, 189 Pac. 793 (192), hospital
represented to be an accredited institution, meeting requirements of State
Board; Miller v. Osterlund, x54 Minn. 495, 1g, N. W. 919 (1923), representation that insurance company had authority to do business in the State. See
21 Mica. L, Rsv. 946.
' Eaglesfield v. Marquis of Londonderry, IL. . 4 Ch. Div. 693 (z876).
218 Mass. z67, io5 N. E. 871 ('9r4).
x26 Atl 865 (R. I.), decided Dee. 26, xg4.
'There was a further representation that the "business was successful
and profitable," but the representation as to the license to use the bottles was
the only one relied upon to show fraud.
"The contention that the misrepresentation was" one of law was not
even made in the case.
Compare this holding with Gormely v. The Gymnastic Asso. of Milwaukee, 55 Wis. 350, 13 N. W. 242 (1882), where a representation that the
defendant had a license to retail liquor was held not actionable fraud, as
being a misrepresentation of law. There the court held that the plaintiff
was as much bound to know the law as the defendant.

NOTES

The presumption of knowledge of the law being incorrect in point
of fact, it is submitted that the doctrine that misstatement of law cannot be actionable fraud should be rejected. The law should not presume what it clearly knows is not the truth, namely, that every one is
learned in the law, especially where it is undesirable from the point
of view of justice so to do. As has already been pointed out, there
is no logical connection between this presumption and the maxim
"ignorance of the law does not excuse," because the latter is efficacious
22
only in the criminal law, and its adoption into the civil side of the
law, under a different guise of "presumption of knowledge" is both
unfortunate and unjustifiable. A person can be as completely damaged by representations of law as of fact, and there appears to be no
good reason why the one causing the damage should be permitted to
say that the one aggrieved had no right to rely upon the inducement
that was made. The latter should be under no more obligation to
employ counsel to determine the accuracy of the statement of law, or
to check up on it, than he is when a misrepresentation of fact is made.
The situation, as the law now is, appears to us to be not so much a
question of whether the ignorance of the one defrauded should be
excused, but rather of whether the one who has secured personal gain
by deceiving another should be relieved from liability to make good
the loss. 2 '

M.E.C.

in the field of criminal law a defendant is in some instances perwhat would otherwise be a crime by pleading ignorance of
excuse
to
mitted
mistaken
the law; for example, one taking the property of another under the
belief it is his own is not guilty of larceny. Comm. v. Stebbins, 8 Gray 492
(Mass., 1857).
"Supra, note II.
' Even

